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ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
Appellants believe that the issues presented are well framed by the primary briefs and

do not attempt herein to simply repeat what has already been stated. The purpose of this
Reply Brief is to point out the errors of analysis made by the Ranger Insurance Company.
The Appellee brief makes a very fundamental error which is actually the same error
made at trial. The error becomes the foundation for going off in a wrong direction on all of
the analysis made. That error is the assumption that there is legal authority to make an arrest
in Miles Langley in Utah. Once that error is understood, that there needs be a reversal of the
trial result becomes beyond dispute.
II.

NO LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR ARREST EXISTED
A.

Utah Law Controls.

Ranger Insurance Company first argues that Gerald Lee could not be apprehended by
Langley defies common sense, common law, and contractual agreements. Ranger reaches
that conclusion only by ignoring the established framework of law.
Ranger argues two legal basis for apprehending Gerald Lee. The first is the alleged
common law right of Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872) which has been exhaustively
discussed in the Lees primary brief. Lees again rely upon that discussion and simply point
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out to the court that Ranger fails to produce any authority rebutting the fact that where a state
scheme regulating arrest by bondsmen is in place, the Taylor case has been found to be
inapplicable. In short, there is no source of authority for Langley coming from Colorado to
do an arrest in Utah under common law.
Second, Ranger makes a curious argument that because Gerald Lee agreed in a
contract that he could be arrested by agents of the bond surety that legal authority existed for
that arrest in Utah by the Colorado agent. Ranger tries to make a negative argument. That
is, they argue because there is no Utah statute that says one cannot arrest from out-of-state
on a contract that it must be legal. Ranger simply ignores Section 53-11-107(2) which
prohibits anyone acting as a bail recovery agent in Utah without having a license. That is
made a crime in Section 53-11-124.
What Ranger argues is that if two people make a bail contract in another state, that
contract overrides Utah law making it a crime for persons not licensed by Utah to make a bail
apprehension. Virtually no authority whatsoever exists for such a proposition. In fact, it is
Ranger that abandons common sense in making this analysis. The common sense approach
would be for Ranger Insurance Company to hire in Utah a licensed bail enforcement agent
rather than allow somebody to come from another state without a license and then claim they
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are somehow above Utah law. This Court should reject the argument completely simply by
applying the plain language of Title 53, Chapter 11.
Mention should be made about the brief statement that Lees failed to marshal the
evidence on the contractual basis for apprehension.

This argument is a complete

misapplication of the requirement that a party marshal the evidence on appeal. The
requirement to marshal is directed to challenges concerning factual findings of the trial court.
Reddish v. Russell 2005 Ut. App. 84 (February 25, 2005). This argument is inapplicable
because there is no issue of factual finding. Lees do not deny that the bail bond contract was
entered and it says what it says. What is at issue is the legal operation of that contract as to
whether it somehow trumps Utah law on the requirement that a bail enforcement agent have
a Utah license. There is no need to marshal the evidence on the requirement that a bail
enforcement agent have a Utah license.
B.

This Issue Was Preserved.

Ranger argues to the court that the error of the trial court in determining the law of
arrest was not properly preserved for appeal. An examination of the record shows that the
issue was talked about from the very beginning of the trial and addressed repeatedly
throughout the trial. Eventually, jury instructions were given in the context of rejecting
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instructions proposed by the Plaintiffs and over the objection of Plaintiffs' counsel to certain
other objections.
Specifically, the issue of the authority of a Colorado agent to arrest in Utah came up
at the beginning of the trial and was actively discussed with the court as shown at Record,
page 1187, at pp. 4-12, 20-31. The actual ruling over the Plaintiffs' objection is found on
page 31 of the transcript.
The District Court then indicated as part of a discussion on a motion brought by the
defense during the course of the trial that it intended to give jury instructions to allow the jury
to decide the legal authority to make an arrest. Again, this was done over the objection of
Plaintiffs' counsel. Record, page 1187 at pp. 213-238.
The court conducted the trial under the assumption that Langley did have legal
authority to make an arrest in Utah but did reserve additional discussion in connection with
jury instructions. Transcript, p. 238 at R., p. 1187. Plaintiffs' counsel stated on the record
that there had been issues about jury instructions discussed in chambers that had to be placed
on the record but the trial court again deferred that. Transcript, p. 181 at R., p. 1187. That
discussion took place commencing at transcript page 243 through 248.
A reading of the extensive repeated discussions between court and counsel on this
topic show that what happened was that Plaintiffs' counsel always took the position that there
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was no legal authority for a Colorado bail recovery agent to make an arrest in Utah and the
court was on the wrong track. Ultimately, counsel conceded that if the court's view was to
be the law of the case then the instructions the court was going to give were appropriate
while reserving the objections to the whole direction of where arrest authority had gone. See
trial transcript pages 213-238,291-295.
Plaintiffs' counsel was so concerned the trial was headed in the wrong direction on
the issue of arrest authority that a trial memorandum was submitted specifically on that point
on the second day of trial. Record, p. 980. That the issue of arrest authority was not a matter
of vigorous contention and objection with the court ultimately instructing contrary to the law
cannot be seriously argued.
The use of the term "exception" to the jury instruction by Ranger is not well taken as
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically state that an "exception" is no longer
necessary and that simply making an objection is sufficient to preserve a point for appeal.
C.

Arrest Authority Was Relevant to Assault.

Ranger makes a brief argument that the legal authority to apprehend Mr. Lee was not
relevant to the jury verdict concerning the assault or reckless endangerment resulting in
harmless error. That position is absolutely wrong.

5

An assault is defined in Utah criminal law in Section 76-5-102 as an attempt, with
unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another. Utah's civil law has similarly held
that the unlawful nature of the act is an element of assault in torts. See Banks v. Shivers, 432
P.2d 339 (Utah 1967). The court there makes reference to Restatement of Torts (2d), Section
21, which says an act of assault must not be "privileged". The official comment to that
section defines privileged as allowed by law.
Put simply, that the contact between Langley and the Lees be unlawful is
extraordinarily important for consideration as it constitutes an element of the tort of assault.
Similarly, the Lees' claim for negligence or reckless endangerment has an element of
breach of duty. The duty is found in the requirement that a bail enforcement agent be
licensed in Utah to act. Once Langley is found to be without legal authority, his actions
could be interpreted by a jury to be at least negligent. The relevance of the legal authority
to act is the foundation of the claim of plaintiffs and the failure of the court to give proper
instruction justifies reversal.
III.

THE FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM SURVIVES
Ranger argues in its brief that since Lees "were unable to assemble evidence in their

case that Mr. Langley falsely imprisoned them" that the claim against the Lees was
appropriately dismissed.
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The failure of this analysis is again rooted in the assumption of the legal authority.
As has already been explained, a key element of false imprisonment is whether it was done
without legal authority. Once the court concluded there was a common law or contract right
to make an arrest in Utah on a Colorado warrant, then the false imprisonment claim had to
fail. This demonstrates the very point Lees attempt to make on appeal that the conclusion
of arrest authority took the court on a completely wrong road. Lees have no dispute with the
concept that if Langley had arrest authority then the false imprisonment claim would fail.
The error is in the conclusion of legal authority as has been analyzed exhaustively above.
A factual question exists as to whether George Lee, who was not a fugitive, was
falsely imprisoned. The trial transcript reflects at Record, page 1187 at p. 214, that the court
dismissed the false imprisonment claim with respect to George Lee based on the absence of
evidence that he was falsely imprisoned. This was error on the court's part, setting aside
issues of whether the arrest effort by Langley was even legal. A jury could have found that
even George was falsely imprisoned under the appropriate legal standard. George's direct
testimony, Record, page 1187 at pp. 188-197, shows that George Lee was in a place he had
a right to be (his own home), and was restrained to that location by the acts of Miles Langley
first knocking him unconscious and Langley then controlling the situation until police
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arrived. While this situation is, admittedly, not an extended false imprisonment, the point
remains that the court should not have taken this factual determination away from the jury.
As a general statement, dismissal is a "severe measure" and should be granted by the
trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief. Colman v. Utah State Land
Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). What the court did in dismissing the George Lee false
imprisonment claim is probably more appropriately labeled a Rule 50 directed verdict as it
occurred at trial. A directed verdict is only appropriate where the court finds as a matter of
law that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence
presented. Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowner's Association v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). This Court has recently held that a
directed verdict in a jury trial is appropriate only after a jury trial. Grossen v. DeWitt, 1999
Ut. App. 167, 982 P.2d 591. There was evidence available to allow the jury to decide
whether false imprisonment of George Lee had taken place.
False imprisonment includes as an element that any exercise of force by which the
other person is deprived of liberty or compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain
is false imprisonment. Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Company, 91 P.2d 507 (Utah
1939). That George Lee was knocked unconscious under force in his own home can be
construed factually as a false imprisonment but the jury never had an opportunity to get to
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that question. With the Lee testimony before the jury, the court should have let them decide
if both were falsely imprisoned, however brief.
IV.

FAILURE TO DEFAULT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Ranger tries to construct an argument that a default in its favor of Robert Thorpe but

not in favor of the Lees for the same failure to appear by Thorpe is somehow not an abuse
of discretion.
Lees do not dispute that Ranger Insurance Company is entitled to a default of Robert
Thorpe for failure to appear at trial. Where the trial court went wrong was not treating the
Lees the same for the same acts by Robert Thorpe.
Ranger argues that the Lees would attempt to "abuse the default judgment" but fails
to explain why any supposed abuse could not have been controlled at trial. The question of
the effect of a default is entirely different from the question of whether a default should be
entered in the first place. The fact remains, as explained in the primary brief, that Robert
Thorpe was allowed to benefit repeatedly throughout the trial by his failure to appear.
Certainly, if the court had refused to enter a default in favor of Ranger an argument could be
made that the court exercised its discretion in fairness to all parties. The refusal to enter a
default in favor of the Lees for the same acts justifying a default in favor of Ranger Insurance
Company is uneven application of justice which should be rejected by this Court.
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Passing mention should be made of the Ranger argument that the Lees failed to
marshal facts concerning the denial of a request for default judgment. Ranger cites no
authority for this argument because there is none. There is no legal requirement under
principles of marshaling that an appellant explain why a judge ruled as he does. The legal
analysis is what he ruled in the context of the trial. A party at trial has no power to force a
judge to fully explain why he or she ruled in a certain way and certainly cannot be held to
have somehow waived an appeal where a judge chose not to amplify sufficiently to satisfy
the opposing party.
V.

THE JUSTICE COURT TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE
Ranger tries again to argue the failure to admit Langley's testimony injustice court

was hearsay. This issue has been adequately explained in the primary brief and is not
analyzed again except to say there is no legal authority to support Ranger's argument that
Langley had no reason to believe he was jeopardizing his self-interest under Rule 804(b)(3),
URE. The fact is, he was admitting to a criminal act under Utah law and that is sufficient to
qualify the statement under that rule.
Another incorrect argument is made by Ranger that excluding Langley's testimony
injustice court was harmless. Ranger argues first that because the jury heard oral argument
on the point to the trial judge that this Court should assume the jury considered the excluded
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evidence as part of its deliberation. Again, there is no legal authority for such a proposition
and it is contrary to common sense and good practice at trial. One cannot assume the jury
made the decision on evidence that was not formally presented or else there would be no
bounds to review of the decision.
Second, Ranger argues that the evidence was irrelevant and therefore harmless in
exclusion because whether Langley was licensed in Utah had no legal importance. This
point, exhaustively discussed in this appeal, demonstrates again how the error on arrest
authority of the court permeates what happened at trial at every turn. Once the court found
there was legal authority outside of the Utah statute requiring a license to act, the
presentation of evidence leading to what the jury was instructed was on a wrong road. In
fact, the lack of Utah license was important to show Langley was acting outside the law and
committed the torts alleged.
VI.

EXCLUSION OF THE RECEIPT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR
Ranger argues that the court correctly excluded the receipt evidencing payment by

Robert Thorpe to Miles Langley for the apprehension of Gerald Lee. Remember that this
arose in the context that Ranger Insurance was presenting evidence, the testimony of Mrs.
Thorpe, that Langley had never been hired or compensated to apprehend Lee. See
Addendum.
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The contrary evidence was deceased Langley's own deposition testimony that he had
been hired to go get Lee. Maria Thorpe, by video deposition, testified no payment was made.
The Lees attempted to introduce this receipt as absolute proof that she was testifying
incorrectly. See Record, page 1187 at p. 39-45 and Addendum, Maria Thorpe Testimony.
Put in the context of the trial, what the jury had before it was (1) the statement of
Langley that he was hired by Robert Thorpe, (2) a defaulting Robert Thorpe that was not
there to be examined, and (3) an affirmative statement by Mrs. Thorpe, an admitted business
partner of Robert, that the payment would never have taken place. The jury was denied the
opportunity to see the handwritten document which conclusively established the payment
took place and that Langley was compensated by Thorpe for the recovery of Lee. With
Langley dead, Robert Thorpe willfully absent from the trial and a video presentation by Mrs.
Thorpe, the impact of her testimony was very important and needed to be rebutted by the
conclusive document which qualified for admission under the Rules of Evidence. Exclusion
of the evidence broke the proof of chain of agency between Langley, Thorpe, and Ranger to
the prejudice of Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
This whole appeal turns upon the question of the arrest authority of a Colorado bail
recovery agent to enforce a Colorado warrant in Utah. Utah law is quite clear that bail
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enforcement agents acting in Utah must have a Utah license. The trial court made a
fundamental error at the beginning of the trial in finding that there was common law
authority or even contractual authority to allow Miles Langley to arrest Gerald Lee.
Plaintiffs' counsel made repeated objections to that approach throughout the trial to no avail.
The error in law by the trial court then had a cascading effect as other issues followed.
That is, the false imprisonment claim of the Plaintiffs was dismissed. The court instructed
the jury that if they believe there was lawful authority to arrest then the assault and
negligence claim could be justified.
Even if this Court were to hold in favor of Ranger Insurance Company, the judgment
should be reversed so as to allow entry of the default of Robert Thorpe. There was no factual
or legal reason to distinguish entering a default in favor of Ranger Insurance Company but
not in favor of the Plaintiffs. Robert Thorpe has continually received the benefit of his
willful failure to participate in the proceedings even to being in default in this very appeal.
Finally, reversible error occurred when the evidence that Langley had no license to
act as a bail agent in Utah was excluded and when the trial court excluded the written receipt
of Robert Thorpe which conclusively showed that he had paid Langley to act in his behalf
in capturing Gerald Lee.
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This Court is respectfully requested to reverse the trial court and remand this case for
a new trial consistent with the law of arrest by a bail enforcement agent.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2005.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

Gregof
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants
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ADDENDUM
Maria Thorpe testimony, R. p. 1187 at pp. 323-324 and deposition at pages 43-46.
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Page 5
1
a.m.
2
Counsel will now identify themselves
3
for the record.
4
MS. BLANCH: Julianne Blanch for
5
Ranger Insurance Company.
6
MR. SANDERS: Craig Sanders for the
7
Plaintiffs.
8
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Joppa Smith, the
9
court reporter, will now swear in the
10
deponent.
* * *
11
12
MARIA E. THORPE,
13 being produced and sworn, was examined and
14 testified as follows:
15
EXAMINATION
16 BY MS. BLANCH:
17
Q. This is Julianne Blanch. Mrs.
18 Thorpe, can you state your full name for the
19 record.
20
A. It's Maria Elizabeth Thorpe.
21
Q. Do you own a business named A-l Bail

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Your Honor, ladies
and gentlemen, today is December the 22nd
of 2003. The following deposition is being
videotaped by Esther Rusk of Rusk & Rusk
Court Reporters, at the conference room of
their office at Skyline Building, 751
Horizon Court, Suite 110, Grand Junction,
Colorado 81506, in the matter of George M.
Lee and Gerald Lee, Plaintiffs, versus
Miles Walter Langley, Robert P. Thorpe and
The Ranger Insurance Company, Defendants,
and filed in the Eighth Judicial District
of Uintah County, State of Utah, Civil No.
000800126. This deposition has been
22 Bonds?
noticed by the Defendants, The Ranger
A. Not currently, no.
23
24
Insurance Company. The deponent is Maria
Q. Did you in 1999?
25
Thorpe. The time is approximately 9:55
A. Yes.
*** Not es ***
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1

Page 42
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Page 43
1
A. The judges usually elevate the
A. That's correct.
2 amount that is required to - for tteir release.
Q. And that he was in jail?
3 Obviously a $500 secured bond wasn't enough to
A. That's correct.
4 warrant Mr. Lee to come back and take care of
Q. And at that point, because he was
5 his court obligations, so by increasing that
in jail, was it necessary for him to get a second
6 amount, the courts are trying to provide an
bond?
7 additional incentive, financial incentive, that
A. For his release, yes. Bob revoked
8 they'll return.
the Mesa County bond, and then posted two bonds
9
Q. Okay. Does A-l have any bail - or
to secure his release on the new warrant
10 did A-l have any bail bondsmen as employees?
amounts.
11
A. No.
Q. So when Gerald Lee came back to
12
Q. Were they independent contractors?
Colorado on April 3 of 1999, the first bond
13
A. They're what's called subagents.
that we've been talking about, the one dated
14
Q. It sounds like there were times when
November 30,1998, was revoked; is that right?
115 someone got a bond with A-l Bail Bonds, they
A. The Rio Blanco bond was never
16 failed to appear, and you needed to go apprehend
revoked at the Mesa County Detention Facility.
17 them.
The Mesa County bond was revoked at the Mesa
18
Sometimes it sounds like you would
19 do it; is that right?
County Detention Facility. To my knowledge,
20
A. Yes.
he was remanded into custody on the Rio Blanco
21
Q. Would your husband ever do it?
warrant, as well as the Mesa County warrant.
22
A. Sometimes.
Q. The second bond is in the amount of
23
Q. And then sometimes you would hire
$750, while the first one back in 1998 is in the
24 these independent contractor bail bondsmen to do
amount of $500.
25 it?
Why was the second bond more?
* * * Notes ***

Il
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page44|
A. As far as I can remember, we've only
I1
hired one person as an independent bail recovery
2
!3
agent, James Julianno out of New Mexico, to
4
apprehend somebody that was out of state.
5
Actually, there's twice. I had a
Kelly - a defendant by the name of Kelly
6
7
Bradbury that had fled on a plane, and she went
8
to Arizona, and I contacted some bail agency
9
in Arizona to meet her at the airport to
detain her until I showed up and could bring her
10
back.
n
Q. Were there any bail agents or bail
12
bondsmen that you hired inside of Colorado to
13
apprehend someone inside of Colorado?
14
A. No.
15
Q. Okay. In the bail bonding industry,
16
is it typical for a company like A-l Bail Bonds,
17
if they're going to hire an individual to go out
18
and apprehend someone, just to hire them for a
19
20
particular job?
21
A. Can you say that again?
22
Q. Sure. If someone like A-l Bail
23
Bonds needs to hire a bail bondsman to apprehend
24
an individual, is it typical in the industry
for them to hire them just for that particular
I 25

1 is that right?

Page 45
job?
A. Yes.
Q. When you used Mr. Julianno as an
independent contractor bail bondsman, how did
you pay him, how did you reimburse him for
apprehending the individual?
A. By check.
Q. Do you understand that Mr. Langley
has testified before in this case, he's given
a deposition just like you have in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. It's my understanding that he
passed away. Do you know whether he has either
way?

A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Langley said in his deposition
that your husband, Robert Thorpe, paid him money
to go get Mr. Lee in Vernal, Utah.
Is that true, to your knowledge?
A. No.
Q. Have you looked through bank
statements and cancelled checks from A-l Bail
Bonds in April and May of 1999 just to verify
that no check was ever given by A-l Bail Bonds
to Mr. Langley?

~c * * *

vireir M, m i s ? rniTRT REPORTERS

Page 42 - Page 45

Page 46
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
[2
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
JO
11
£
!3
!4
>5

A. Yes.
Q. What have you found?
A. There was no such payment.
Q. Okay. Go ahead.
A. There was also Gerald and Sherry
Green that we've used for recovery, but like I
said, those are just on a limited basis. And we
would hire some out-of-state people to find
people that are out of state to minimize our
costs, because we don't know the areas, and it
just takes a lot of time.
Q. And have you paid all of those
individuals with a check?
A. Yes.
MS. BLANCH: Let's mark as Exhibit 4
what I've put in front of our court
reporter.
(Exhibit 4 marked).

l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
<U
12
13
14
|15
16

BY MS. BLANCH:

il9

Q. This is something that you sent to me
last week; is that right?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Okay. As Mr. Sanders is looking it
over, because he hasn't seen this yet, could you
tell us what Exhibit 4 is?

J17
18
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page 471
A. It's bank statements for our business
account, for A-l Bail Bonds.
Q. From what time period?
A. I believe from the end of March
until maybe May or June.
Q. Okay. And why did-A. Prior to the date of his recovery,
and then a month or more after that time.
Q. Why did you get those bank
statements?
A. To look to see if a payment had, in
fact, been made. You know, just to clarify, so
that I could make exactresponsestoday. Even
though I had no knowledge of any payment, I
just wanted to double-check for my own peace of
mind.
Q. And you've also brought cancelled
checks with you, I noticed?
A. Yes, ma'am, so that if there's any
misunderstanding about any amount that appears
on there, that the actual check can be viewed to
see to whom it was endorsed and where it was
cashed and the date it was issued.
Q. Okay. If Mr. Sanders wishes during a
break, will he be able to look through those

*** Nol ies"1_ _
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l
Q. So one is dated November 30,'98, the
cancelled checks?
2 other is dated April 3 of '99?
A. Absolutely.
3
A. That's correct
Q. But you can tell us now that after
4
Q. Between the time that vou learned
looking at your bank statements and the cancelled
5 that Miles Langley had apprehended Gerald Lee
checks, there were no checks made out to Miles
6 and brought him back to Colorado and the time
Langley?
7 you issued the second bond on April 3 of 1999,
A. No, ma'am.
8 did you or anyone at A-l Bail Bonds tell Ranger
Q. We have been talking about two
9 that Mr. Langley had apprehended Mr. Lee?
bonds, one is November 30,1998, and then there
10
A. I don't believe so, no.
was a second one. I don't know if you've
11
Q. Did you or anyone else at A-l Bail
brought that with you.
12 Bonds tell Ranger about the circumstances of
A. I think both bonds were originally
13 how Mr. Langley had apprehended Mr. Lee?
written on the same date, and then when he was
14
re-incarcerated, both bonds would be posted on
A. I don't believe so.
15
the same date, to the best of my knowledge.
Q. Okay. To your knowledge, would
16 Ranger have had any way of knowing that there
Q. Okay. The second bond would have
17 was a scuffle between Mr. Langley and the Lee
been dated around April 3 of 1999, wouldn't it
18 brothers during the apprehension?
have?
19
A. Not by our agency, no.
A. Yes, ma'am. April 30 maybe. April 3
20
(Exhibit 5 marked).
or April 30, I'm sorry.
Q. Okay. Between the time that you
j 21 BY MS. BLANCH:
22
Q. What we've marked as Exhibit 5 is a
1
learned 23 copy of the bail bond underwriting agreement
1
A. April 3.
24 between Ranger and A-l Bail Bonds.
1
Q. Okay. April 3?
25
MS. BLANCH: And I don't know
A. Yes, ma'am.
*** No1es *
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